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Scotland has long been recognised as an active participant in the series of conflicts between 
the French and English realms known as the Hundred Years War. From the 1330s onwards, 
Scotland’s external relations, even the kingdom’s survival, were defined by this wider 
warfare which drew in most of the lands of north-western Europe.1 However, this 
significance appears to have declined during the final phase of the conflict. Unlike the 
fourteenth century, the period from the 1420s to the early 1450s witnessed little major 
conflict on the Anglo-Scottish border.2 Scotland’s major contribution in these years was to 
provide large contingents of soldiers to sustain Charles VII’s cause during its lowest ebb 
between 1419 and 1429.3 While, as will be discussed, this had a legacy in later decades, after 
1429 Scotland would appear to have been marginal to Anglo-French warfare. The final, 
decisive campaigns from July 1449 to 1453 which saw Charles’s armies win control of 
Normandy and Gascony from the English king, did not involve the direct participation of 
Scots in any numbers.  
Nevertheless, the later 1440s have been identified by a number of historians as a 
period which illustrated Scotland’s connections with continental elites. In July 1449, weeks 
before the resumption of war in northern France, the eighteen-year-old King James II of 
Scotland married Marie, daughter of Duke Arnold of Guelders and great-niece of Philip the 
Good duke of Burgundy.4 The match and the events which accompanied it demonstrated 
Scotland’s contacts with princes like Duke Philip and also showed the ongoing value of the 
French alliance. Charles VII assisted in negotiations for the wedding and in arranging 
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marriages for several of James’s sisters. His interest derived from the marriage of his own 
son, the Dauphin Louis, to James II’s eldest sister, Margaret, in 1436.5 Though Margaret had 
died in 1445, Charles deployed her sisters in his own efforts to forge alliances.6 Scottish 
participation in this world of European court culture was further displayed by the ceremonial 
which accompanied the marriage and by the visit of a party of Burgundian knights to 
Scotland in February 1449 to engage in deeds of arms with their Scottish counterparts. These 
events have generated a cluster of excellent discussions which strengthen our sense of the 
kingdom’s interactions with princely and noble society on the continent.7  
However this focus on marriage and tournament has overshadowed other events and 
contacts in the year and a half leading up to King James’s marriage and the outbreak of 
Anglo-French war in July 1449. This article will show that there was a high degree of 
engagement between politics in Scotland and the actions of rulers across north-western 
Europe. Moreover this engagement was not simply with the kings of France and England but 
included a much wider group of rulers. Above all this meant the dukes of Burgundy and 
Brittany, princes of France but also powerful and independent players in the politics of north-
western Europe. Like these two dukes, the Scottish king and his government participated in 
an increasingly fluid and multi-centred world. While not suggesting that Scotland possessed 
the influence or power to initiate major changes between these rulers in isolation, it will be 
argued that the negotiations for the king’s marriage were only one of a range of objectives 
pursued by the Scottish government and that their role was neither passive nor as satellites of 
richer rulers. There will be three focal points; the warfare between Scotland and England in 
1448 and 1449, the movements and activities of the embassy sent from Scotland to the 
continent in the summer of 1448 and the internal politics of Scotland in these months whilst 
its young king was on the cusp of personal power. As well as being parallel in time, these 
developments were also interlinked in their courses and outcomes. 
From September 1448 until August 1449 the Scots were engaged in a period of open 
warfare with England along the marches between the two kingdoms. This was the most 
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intensive border conflict for at least thirty years.8 It began in September with a Scottish foray 
into Northumberland and then, after an English counter attack which drove off 500 cattle, 
another Scottish force burned the suburbs of Carlisle.9 This provoked a major response. An 
English army led by Henry Percy son of the earl of Northumberland advanced into 
Dumfriesshire but was routed by a Scottish host drawn from across south-west Scotland 
under Hugh Douglas earl of Ormond. Recorded in English, Scottish and French chronicles, 
this battle of Lochmabenstane or Sark was the Scots’ only significant victory on the marches 
during the fifteenth century.10 In an attempt to avenge the defeat, the English march warden, 
Richard earl of Salisbury, mustered a larger army and invaded Scotland in November. While 
one English account claimed Salisbury burned ‘the greet part of the marches of Scotland’, 
another said ‘he returned with shame, having achieved nothing’, allowing the Scots to claim 
victory.11 During the winter both sides prepared for further warfare. Ormond’s brother, 
William earl of Douglas issued a military ordinance for the borders in December while the 
English government excused northern magnates from attending parliament to guard against 
the ‘malice’ of the Scots in the daily ‘hurt … of our marches’.12 Renewed fighting began in 
the spring. According to the near-contemporary account in the Auchinleck Chronicle, Dunbar 
was burned by the recently-released Henry Percy in May and in June the earl of Salisbury 
sacked Dumfries. However on 3 June a Scottish host led by Douglas, Ormond and the earls of 
Angus and Orkney burned the Percies’ town of Alnwick and in mid-July, after James II’s 
wedding, Douglas led a force even further south to burn Warkworth, at the gates of a second 
Percy castle.13 By the time of this last campaign a short truce had already been agreed to 
begin on 10 August. It was only to run for six weeks but was then lengthened to November 
when the truce was extended at the pleasure of both king to end on 180 days’ notice.14 
As in the 1380s and 1400s, the war was a series of cross-border campaigns led by 
major magnates aimed at causing material damage to the enemy.15 Evidence from the English 
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marches reveals the destruction caused by Scottish attacks and, while the Scottish borders 
probably suffered similarly, the balance of fighting and especially the victory at 
Lochmabenstane allowed the Scots to claim the advantage.16 English chronicles state that the 
impetus for the fighting came from the Scottish side who chose to break a truce which was 
due to run until 1454.17 However, if this was the case, Scottish motives are hard to judge. 
Unlike the most recent Scottish campaigns in 1417 and 1436, there was no attempt to capture 
Berwick or Roxburgh, the final English-held outposts in Scotland but the scale of the fighting 
suggests it was not just an escalation of border raiding. Nor do these attacks seem directly 
connected to continental warfare. In the autumn of 1448 the truce between Charles VII and 
Henry VI was still holding. A year later, when the Scots accepted truces with England, 
Charles’s armies were breaking into Normandy. The war has been linked to the ambitions of 
the Black Douglases. The leading role they played suggests a continuation of the family’s use 
of warfare as a means of displaying their significance. However, warfare of this scale which 
clearly involved the royal government and other leading figures was probably not driven by 
the Douglases in isolation.18 
English chroniclers also associated the outbreak of warfare to the presence of their 
king in the north of his realm.19 In September 1448 Henry VI travelled to York and Durham, 
visiting northern England for the first time in his twenty-six year reign. While this 
exceptional progress has been related to concerns about the Scots, there is no evidence of 
either military or diplomatic preparations before the king’s journey.20 Warfare only seems to 
have started after Henry had reached the region. Instead the journey’s political purpose was 
probably linked to the recent violent feuding between the earl of Northumberland and the 
king’s councillor, Archbishop Kemp of York.21 In a letter written by Henry to his old teacher 
and doctor, John Somerset, the king described the journey as a ‘pilgrimage’ and dwelled, 
characteristically, on the state of the northern church and on the faith and loyalty of the 
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people.22 If relations with Scotland were not behind the royal progress, the coincidence 
between Henry’s visits to York and Durham and the first Scottish incursions is striking.  The 
presence of the English king in the north would also have heightened the impact of the Scots’ 
incursions in England and beyond the island of Britain. 
The desire to make such an impact can be connected to the contemporaneous 
activities of the Scottish king’s councillors on the continent. Before the onset of the war and 
lasting almost its whole course, groups of Scottish envoys were moving between the princely 
courts of northern France. The instructions given to these envoys reflected the wider aims of 
the royal government. Such contacts were hardly new. In particular, since the Franco-Scottish 
treaty of 1428 and the match between the dauphin and Princess Margaret in 1436, the 
marriage of James II’s other sisters and the king himself had brought the Scots into ongoing 
negotiations with European courts.23 Most recently, in 1447, Charles arranged the betrothal of 
Eleanor Stewart to the Habsburg prince, Sigismund duke of Austria-Tyrol. In doing so 
Charles swatted away James II’s suggestion that Eleanor should marry the widowed dauphin 
and in September the Scottish king consented to the Habsburg match.24 However, from 
January 1448 there was a new impetus to Scottish diplomatic plans. At the root of this was 
the question of the king’s own marriage. This could hardly be left in the hands of the French 
king. The matter was introduced by James in a letter to Charles VII sent on 9 January. This 
announced that ‘we plan to send our ambassadors to your most serene highness, both for the 
choosing of a consort for us, for the marrying of our sisters and for other difficult matters 
concerning us and the res publica of our realm’.25 ‘A heavy tax … on the whole kingdom, 
both clergy and people’ was levied ‘for an embassy sent to France for the marriage of the 
king’ probably on the authority of a general council which met in January to discuss the 
matter.26 This first royal taxation for seven years was a mark of the importance of the venture 
to king and council. 
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The significance of the embassy was also demonstrated by its membership. The senior 
figure was the chancellor of Scotland, William lord Crichton, who had been involved in 
diplomatic activity since the 1420s and had been one of the leading figures in the politics of 
James’s minority. Of his companions, John Ralston was secretary of the king and had 
recently been promoted to the see of Dunkeld, and Nicholas Otterburn was official of St 
Andrews and a canon of Glasgow.27 The letters carried by these envoys on 6 May 1448 
confirmed the breadth of their duties. Most importantly they were granted powers to negotiate 
the king’s marriage and arrange matches for his sisters, Eleanor and Joan. While Charles VII 
was asked for help with this, it was clear that the matter would be directly negotiated between 
the ambassadors and other princes. They were given full power to discuss the marriage of the 
princesses with Duke Sigismund, but also with the duke of Burgundy and the count of 
Armagnac.28 However, the Burgundian link was more telling. Crichton and his partners had 
authority to arrange James II’s marriage to a lady from the houses of Burgundy, Cleves or 
Guelders. This direct contact is not surprising. As David Ditchburn, Alexander Stevenson and 
Amy Eberlin have shown, there were centuries-old trading contacts between Scotland and the 
Low Countries.29 These represented one of Scotland’s key external relationships and made 
the short sea-journey from the Firth of Forth to the Flemish coast a very familiar route for 
merchants and others. Economic ties had also generated political contacts going back to the 
twelfth century.30 It was natural for the Scots to seek a bride from the connections of Philip 
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the Good Duke of Burgundy, the ruler of most of the Netherlands. In 1446 the Scottish 
government had considered one of the daughters of Duke Arnold of Guelders for their queen, 
a match which would create an alliance with Philip of Burgundy, the great-uncle of the two 
noblewomen.31 The envoys’ responsibilities were not limited to arranging royal marriages. 
They were also instructed to seek an alliance with the duke of Burgundy and to conclude 
agreements with King Charles and perhaps also the duke of Brittany. The mission would last 
almost a year and had ambitious, multiple aims.  
These different goals have been treated as separate or static expressions of Scotland’s 
established connections with the continent. Instead, from January 1448 onwards, the use of 
this embassy and the actions of the envoys suggest a more fluid operation which was bound 
up with a rapidly shifting political world from the Scottish borders to the marches of 
Normandy. The dispatch of the embassy related to wider events in European politics. In the 
letters the envoys carried to Charles VII, the French king was informed that the negotiations 
which he had recently held with the king of England ‘appeared to mean the breaking of the 
… alliance’ between France and Scotland.32 From the outset, the presence of a well-funded 
embassy was designed to place the Scottish kingdom and its interests on the table, using royal 
marriages, past and present, and, from September, warfare as ways of influencing events on 
the continent. 
It is not clear when the envoys departed. Crichton and Ralston had both witnessed 
royal charters in April and on 7 May but did not appear on the king’s progress to Inverness in 
the second half of July.33 On 16 May Crichton gave a gift of local property to St Anthony’s 
Hospital in Leith.34 This institution, founded in 1430, was patronised by merchants trading 
between Scotland and Flanders. In 1461 it would receive a donation from Duke Philip of 
Burgundy.35 Crichton’s charter was witnessed by his family but also by his fellow envoys. 
The charter may indicate that the embassy was about to depart and that Flanders and links to 
the Burgundian court were regarded the focus of their initial activity. In late August and mid-
September they were entertained by Duke Philip and probably did not travel to Charles VII’s 
court until late September.36 The ambassadors were not present as planned for the marriage of 
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Eleanor to Duke Sigismund on 8 September where James II was represented instead by 
Thomas Spens, another cleric who had travelled out after 10 June, and by the captain of 
Charles’s Scottish bodyguard, Nicholas Chalmers. That Spens and Chambers lacked the 
proper royal letters had caused a delay in the marriage from August.37 The absence of 
Crichton, Ralston and Otterburn was probably a result of progress in the negotiations over the 
king’s marriage. On 6 September Burgundy extracted the permission of the duke of Guelders 
to negotiate his daughter’s marriage to the Scottish king and James II gave his envoys power 
to conclude the marriage and alliance in early November.38 It was only on 29 September that 
the Scottish envoys presented themselves at King Charles’s court at Tours, handing over 
letters from James whose contents suggest they were written in the spring.39  
These movements may suggest that the Scots were operating independently from 
Charles in focussing their efforts on the Burgundian court. If so it is also significant that, a 
few weeks later, the Scottish ambassadors had travelled west to attend Duke Francis of 
Brittany at Vannes. On 22 October, a treaty was agreed with the duke and with his duchess, 
James II’s sister, Isabella.40 As well as agreeing mutual support and the inclusion of each 
party in other alliances made by them, the treaty recognised Isabella and Francis as heirs to 
the Scottish throne should James die childless.41 From Brittany, Crichton and his companions 
returned to Tours where they met with King Charles’s representatives over Christmas. On 31 
December a renewed alliance was agreed between them which referred to the series of 
alliances back to the treaty of Corbeil between Robert I of Scotland and Charles IV of France 
in 1326 which had been made ‘to forestall the enterprises which the English were accustomed 
to make against and to the damage of the kings, kingdoms and subjects of France and 
Scotland.’42 Having secured this agreement, the Scottish envoys returned to Bruges in the 
New Year, perhaps in time to witness the departure of the Burgundian knights for Scotland in 
February. By 1 April the marriage of James II and Marie de Guelders had been agreed and, 
on that date, the Scots concluded an alliance with Philip duke of Burgundy. This recognised 
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the earlier agreements of the Scots with the Breton duke and French king, but included 
mutual support in any future war embarked on by either party.43 Charles VII gave his support 
to this alliance. On 15 April Crichton and Ralston wrote to Charles thanking him for his 
envoys’ help during the talks and asking for permission to visit Paris to see the relics at 
Sainte Chapelle.44 The two envoys had returned to Flanders in time to set sail with Marie de 
Guelders and her escort on 9 June. Despite fears of interception by English ships, the party 
arrived in Scotland and Marie was lodged in the hospital of St Anthony’s in Leith, which 
Crichton had patronised prior to his departure.45 On 25 June James II ratified the Burgundian 
alliance, gave promises about the lands to be assigned to his queen and renounced any claims 
on Guelders.46 Four days later he confirmed that he had received the first instalment of the 
queen’s dowry of 60,000 écus d’or and the wedding took place at Holyrood Abbey on 3 
July.47 
In the year from May 1448 Scottish envoys had negotiated treaties of alliance with the 
French king and the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany and arranged a marriage for their 
monarch. The efforts of Crichton, Ralston, Otterburn, Thomas Spens and others ran alongside 
the period of sharp warfare against England. News of this conflict may well have provided a 
backdrop to their discussions. There is evidence that such news was channelled through the 
envoys. The official French royal chronicler, Jean Chartier, included an exaggerated account 
of Scottish victories over the English in late 1448. This had been brought to his abbey of St 
Denis by three Scottish clerics one of whom was a canon and ‘a well-known and reliable 
person’ who swore his words were true on the relics of St Denis and was questioned by 
Chartier himself.48 The canon may have been either Nicholas Otterburn or Thomas Spens and 
the episode suggests that the Scottish envoys were keen to propagate a positive view of their 
compatriots’ exploits against the English. On 15 April 1449 William Crichton responded to 
the French king’s request for ‘the news and state of the realm of Scotland’ after the envoys 
had left his court by saying that he had nothing to add to ‘that which we have written to 
Nicholas Chalmers captain of your Christian majesty’s guard’.49  It seems likely that one of 
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the ambassadors’ roles was to work via the French king’s Scottish servants like Chalmers and 
the increasingly influential William Monypenny, to convey favourable ‘news’ from Scotland 
to the French court.50 
If James II’s marriage provided the main justification for the dispatch of a well-
funded and prestigious embassy, the desire of king and council to engage with European 
politics was another part of the envoys’ role from the outset. The letters of introduction which 
they carried to Charles VII made this clear. The matter of James’s marriage was briefly 
mentioned before the Scottish king appealed to the ‘ancient alliances between France and 
Scotland’. This was not just a formal reference to the connection between the realms but a 
product of recent events. James’s letter stated that ‘being informed about negotiations 
between your highness and the king of England … (which) appeared to mean the breaking of 
the said alliance, we took care to dispatch our letters of exhortation and our envoys to your 
highness’ to ensure the Franco-Scottish bond remained unbroken. Scottish concerns related to 
the apparent switch in Charles’s relations with Henry VI.51 In January and February 1448 
Charles was on the point of besieging Le Mans which the English had failed to hand over 
under the terms of the Truce of Tours from 1444.52 The English capitulation over Le Mans in 
March changed the mood. The truce was extended to 1451 and negotiations planned which 
might turn this into a ‘final peace’.53 During the summer and autumn discussions were held to 
consider a meeting between the French and English kings north of Paris to assist in this 
goal.54 A permanent resolution of the Anglo-French conflict would threaten Scotland’s 
security. Yet, if this was a major concern, it is striking that there was no evidence of the Scots 
envoys reaching Charles’s court until September 1448. Was their arrival at that point timed to 
announce the renewal of open war between Scotland and England? One of the stated issues in 
the renewed alliance agreed in December concerned the position of one of the parties being at 
war with England while their partner was at truce.55 The initiation of warfare would have 
vividly demonstrated this situation to the French. 
The decision of the Scottish ambassadors to leave Charles’s court and travel to 
Brittany in October must also be examined in light of wider events. The alliance agreed 
between the envoys and Duke Francis and Duchess Isabella emphasised the family bond 
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between the houses of Montfort and Stewart, by acknowledging them as heirs presumptive to 
the Scottish throne.56 Such terms were an overt recognition of Scottish obligations to the duke 
of Brittany at a time when he was under severe political pressure. During the summer of 1448 
the English had begun re-fortifying places on the Breton border with Normandy and using 
them to raid into the duchy.57 This aggression was linked to efforts to force Duke Francis to 
release his pro-English brother, Gilles, whom the duke had imprisoned in 1446.58 The French 
king expressed his concern for the honour and safety of the duke and duchy and his 
representatives raised both issues with English envoys during the summer.59 Charles was, 
however, unwilling to break the truce on these grounds.60 The formal alliance between Duke 
Francis and James II went further than Charles could and linked the Bretons to a kingdom 
already actively at war with the English. The agreement may have offered only symbolic 
support to the duke but it contained a promise to include each party in future alliances made 
by the other which was recognised in the Scottish-Burgundian treaty the following year.61 
These negotiations with Philip duke of Burgundy fulfilled the central purpose of the 
Scottish embassy. The marriage agreement secured a queen for James II on terms 
advantageous to Scotland. A large dowry and a bond with a ruler whose lands were far richer 
and more populous than the Scottish kingdom and included Scotland’s most important 
trading partners were of obvious benefit to King James. As mentioned above, the treaty 
agreed between Philip and the ambassadors on 1 April went beyond the marriage. It promised 
mutual good service between king and duke which recognised, as well as Scottish obligations 
to the duke of Brittany, that the alliances between Scotland and France ‘which are being 
renewed’ prevented the Scots from joining in any war against King Charles. The duties of 
both princes to the duke of Guelders were also recognised. Mutual support clearly included 
military assistance. The treaty stated that, after the end of existing truces, if either party 
engaged in a new war the other would give assistance in the form of men, ships, food, 
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artillery or weapons. Once again, this promise was made by a continental prince, who was at 
truce with England, with the Scottish king whose realm was at war with them.62 
The presence of Crichton and Ralston at the Burgundian court in the summer of 1448 
and again in early 1449 can also be connected with the well-known passage of arms between 
Scottish and Burgundian knights before James II at Stirling. As David Ditchburn has 
observed, the occasion was one of major symbolic significance in relation to the ongoing 
negotiations.63 The attention the event received in contemporary works and the absence of 
other similar exchanges point strongly to a direct link between the chivalric contest and 
discussions over an alliance. The challenge was delivered in July 1448, just after the arrival 
of the envoys in Flanders and the Burgundian party crossed to Scotland in February 1449 
perhaps once Crichton and Ralston had returned there from the French court.64 Ditchburn has 
also pointed to the direct role of Duke Philip in sponsoring the venture and to the links of 
service between the duke and the Burgundian knights who took part.65 Such men would have 
been able to convey useful impressions of Scotland and its king back to Philip. These 
impressions may have encompassed military potential. As well as courtiers and officials, the 
three knights were soldiers who would play important roles in the duke’s war against the 
rebellious city of Ghent in the early 1450s.66 In this light, the emphasis which all accounts of 
these events place on the house of Douglas is significant. The challenge was issued to 
William earl of Douglas’s brother, James master of Douglas, the earl was nominated as judge 
over the combat should the king be unable to perform this role, and comment was made about 
the retinue which Earl William brought to Stirling.67 According to D’Escouchy, the earl ‘had 
fittingly in his company, from the account of those who knew the truth, four to six thousand 
men’, an impression repeated by Georges Chastellain, Lalaing’s biographer.68 This display of 
the family’s reputation and military resources may have been for the benefit of the visiting 
Burgundians and drawn their attention to the recent warfare in the marches with England.69 It 
may also be linked to the military character of the alliance agreed by the Scottish embassy 
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with the duke of Burgundy on 1 April after the return of the knights. Despite English fears of 
an attack on Calais in early 1449, Philip chose not to break his truce with England.70 He did, 
however, give a sign of his value as an ally to the Scots by sending a consignment of military 
equipment, including armour, shields, swords, crossbows and gunpowder artillery to 
Scotland. These were dispatched in five galleys, probably at the time of the royal marriage in 
July 1449. They were included in the gifts which accompanied the occasion and were 
delivered to a kingdom still at war with England.71 
Scottish diplomacy in 1448-9 has been seen as operating in conjunction with the 
interests of Charles VII.72 From the autumn of 1448 there was certainly a growing alignment 
between the French and Scottish kingdoms expressed in the renewal of the alliance. By 
August Charles was exasperated with the behaviour of the English and especially Edmund 
duke of Somerset, the new lieutenant of Normandy. Somerset was accused of sponsoring the 
harassment of the Breton frontier, of refusing compensation and threatening French envoys, 
and of failing to accord Charles his royal title as previous lieutenants had done.73 Against this 
background the alliance between the Scots and the duke of Brittany in October could have 
served as a means for Charles to provide Francis with support without breaking his own truce 
with Henry VI. Similarly, on 15 April, the Scottish envoys thanked Charles for the help of his 
own representatives in their negotiations with the duke of Burgundy.74 These discussions 
occurred following the conclusion of negotiations between representatives of Charles VII and 
Philip the Good at Paris in January which resolved a range of issues between the king and the 
duke, mostly in favour of the latter.75 When Somerset ordered the seizure of the Breton town 
of Fougères in late March it led Charles to prepare for the formal resumption of warfare. 
Duke Francis was obviously engaged in warfare already and, although Philip still refused to 
enter the conflict, he recognised the justice of the French king’s position and agreed to allow 
men at arms from his lands to serve in Charles’s armies.76 
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The Scots king was clearly regarded as part of this alignment. On 3 June 1449 Charles 
VII instructed his envoy to inform the English that their aggression towards the Duke of 
Brittany touched both his own honour but also that of the king of Scots and the duke of 
Burgundy ‘who are near kin, friends and allies of my said lord of Brittany’.77 However, 
Scotland’s engagement with the French king and the dukes of Brittany and Burgundy which 
the embassy of 1448-9 had shaped need not be regarded as simply fitting in with King 
Charles’s consistent policy. On the embassy’s departure for the continent in May 1448 the 
Scots had expressed anxiety, even discontent, about the French king’s relations with Henry 
VI.78 Their initial contacts had been with Burgundy and by September they had clearly 
reached a preliminary agreement with the duke for the Scottish king’s marriage without any 
identifiable input from Charles.79 The agreement with the duke and duchess of Brittany and 
especially their recognition as the Scottish king’s heirs presumptive suggests distinct motives 
were at work. Most importantly, Scottish warfare against England from September 1448 until 
the following summer cannot be linked to Charles VII’s position at that time. Instead it must 
have reflected the judgement of the Scottish king and council. As will be discussed, the 
timing of the warfare may indicate internal interests but it was probably exploited by 
Crichton and his companions to demonstrate Scotland’s military credentials to continental 
audiences and to encourage a wider resumption of warfare against England. According to the 
chronicler Matthieu D’Escouchy, Charles cited the war of the English against the Scots as 
one justification for his own formal renunciation of the truce on 31 July 1449.80 
Reports of the Anglo-Scottish war served another purpose. The Scots retained a 
reputation as a source of ‘men, brave and strong’ who had fought in large numbers for 
Charles VII.81 Smaller contingents had found their way into Burgundian service and Duke 
Philip’s father had been keen to recruit more.82 Bloody defeats at Verneuil and elsewhere did 
not end the interest of continental rulers in Scotland as a source of troops. The alliance of 
1428 between Charles VII and James I, which brought the Scottish king not just the marriage 
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of his daughter to the Dauphin Louis but also promised possession of the county of 
Saintonge, was linked to the dispatch of another Scottish army, of 6,000 men, to serve 
Charles.83 In the event this force was never sent. By the time the marriage was celebrated in 
1436, the French king did not need a Scottish army. While he continued to keep his personal 
guard of Scots and employed others in his ordonnance companies, after 1430 Charles did not 
want a force of the size or independence of the earlier Scottish armies. However, other 
princes may have been interested.84 In the 1460s Duke Francis II of Brittany and Philip of 
Burgundy’s son, Charles, would negotiate for the support of the Scottish government in the 
form of sizeable contingents of soldiers.85 It is possible that in 1449 Duke Philip was 
exploring the possibility of obtaining such support in the manner of both his father and son. 
His alliance with James II specified mutual military aid in unequivocal terms. While, as 
stated above, the terms excluded Scottish assistance to Burgundy against Scotland’s ally the 
French king, the duke’s military concerns in the early 1450s were with German princes and 
with the growing hostility of the city of Ghent.86 Against these enemies, Scottish soldiers 
could have proved useful. 
Scottish martial activities dovetailed with diplomatic objectives in a way which was 
far from unique. In the decade after 1450 James II continued this approach. His letters to 
Charles VII repeatedly informed the French king of his military plans and actions, urging him 
to participate in a common conflict against England.87 Charles had, by then, expelled the 
English from Normandy and Gascony and refused to embark on further campaigns but James 
may have been trying to repeat the tactics employed by him or in his name in 1448-9. 
However, if the Scottish king’s envoys sought to encourage Charles to make war in July 
1449, why did the Scots then enter their own truce with the English a few weeks later? The 
most obvious reason is that, by summer 1449, the Scots had achieved their goals by securing 
their king’s marriage, removing immediate concerns about an Anglo-French peace, and 
proclaiming their value as an ally. The costs and damages of the war with the destruction of 
southern burghs and wider plundering by English forces may have outweighed the benefits of 
continued warfare. Though the initial truces were for a few weeks, there was no desire to 
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renew the conflict despite reports of Charles VII’s successful conquest of upper Normandy in 
late 1449. It is also striking that, while James II ratified the alliance and agreements with the 
duke of Burgundy before his wedding, the alliances with Charles and the dukes of Brittany 
and Austria were not finalised until late December.88 There was clearly no rush to confirm 
these apparently important alliances, let alone participate in a military coalition against 
England. 
Given the efforts of the Scottish envoys during the preceding twelve months these 
delays may have appeared duplicitous. However the timing of the ratification and the motives 
behind Scottish decisions during the previous two years were also bound up with the 
kingdom’s political life. Central to this was King James II himself. James had turned 
seventeen in October 1447. A month earlier a letter in his name to Charles VII, James had 
reported that ‘at the present time … we enjoy bodily health and, with the happy days of youth 
passing, we hold our kingdom in the tranquillity of peace’.89 Any peace had only occurred 
after a politically-disturbed minority in which James’s person was used as the basis for the 
authority of a shifting group of councillors.90 By 1447-8 there are signs that the young king 
was, as he stated, moving out of tutelage and shaping royal policy on certain matters. The 
issue of James’s own marriage was central to this, as a vital concern for both the king and his 
subjects. As the Breton alliance demonstrated, James lacked an heir who was male and 
resident in Scotland. Without these, the stability of dynasty of realm was in question. 
Moreover, between November 1447 and June 1448 there were significant changes in 
the offices held by James’s councillors. In November 1447, following the death of the 
incumbent, William lord Crichton had resumed office as chancellor of Scotland. He had held 
this post from 1439 until 1445, using it to direct royal policy.91 Crichton had been stripped of 
the office as part of his surrender in the summer of 1445 during a period of civil war which 
left William’s rivals, the Livingstons and Douglases, as the dominant figures around the 
king.92 Crichton’s rehabilitation may represent a gradual rapprochement with his former 
enemies but, given the trust and favour which James II would later show to William’s family, 
it could also suggest the will of the young king at work. This is more explicit in a second shift 
in office-holding. At some point between early May and late June 1448, James Livingston’s 
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position as keeper of the king’s person, which he had held for three years, was terminated.93 
This did not signify the eclipse of the Livingston family. James Livingston was appointed 
royal chamberlain in late June and with his father, Alexander, and other kinsmen continued to 
witness royal charters.94 However at the point when his marriage was being negotiated and 
just before he made his first royal progress into northern Scotland in July 1448, the end of 
James’s formal tutelage was being signalled.95 
This period of emerging royal will and authority was one of risk and opportunity for 
the king’s councillors. Crichton’s successes on the embassy probably heightened his standing 
with the king. By contrast, the Livingstons were caught up in the consequences of the 
marriage as the king’s financial officers. The need to supply adequate resources to support 
Queen Marie created strains. In August 1449 James acknowledged that the royal comptroller, 
Robert Livingston, was owed nearly £1000 by the crown which James undertook to pay from 
the queen’s dowry.96 The following month the comptroller was arrested along with James and 
Alexander Livingston and other members of the family, in part as a way of wiping out the 
king’s debts and resuming possession of royal properties.  
There was another powerful influence on these relations. William eighth earl of 
Douglas and his brothers were the most powerful lineage in Scotland beneath the king. The 
earls of Douglas and Ormond took leading roles in the account of recent Anglo-Scottish 
warfare in the ‘Auchinleck Chronicle’ and the family was the focus of the encounter with the 
Burgundians at Stirling. Both events reflected the status of the Douglas reputation beyond 
Scotland. In this context, the stress which chronicle accounts placed on the strength of Earl 
William’s retinue would have triggered memories. Archibald fourth earl of Douglas and his 
sons had fought for Charles VII between 1419 and 1424 at the head of armies of Scottish 
soldiers.97 This earl had previously concluded an agreement with Philip duke of Burgundy’s 
father, in which Douglas had promised to serve Duke John with 4,000 men in Flanders or 
Artois.98 From early 1448 Earl William sought to reclaim his uncle’s continental role. He was 
probably involved in the planning of the embassy of Crichton and Ralston and, typically, 
used the mission to push the rights of his house.99 As well as his credentials, Crichton also 
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carried a letter for the Douglases on his travels. This letter was written to Charles VII in the 
name of the elderly Margaret Stewart dowager countess of Douglas, James II’s aunt and the 
widow of the fourth earl of Douglas. Margaret was also the grandmother of Earl William’s 
own wife. The letter asked that the French king hear the dowager’s claim to a share of the 
French estates which he had given to her husband ‘considering how very dearly I have 
bought them by the blood of my … husband and of my children in your service’.100 Earl 
William’s hand was behind this request for part of the rich duchy of Touraine.101 It may have 
been employed as a means of reminding Charles of his debt to the Douglas family rather than 
in serious hope of securing the province. Charles VII’s response was courteous but firm. The 
French king recalled his ‘good love’ and ‘remembrance’ of the fourth earl and named Earl 
William as ‘his good kinsman in his singular recommendation’.102 He pointed out that 
Touraine had been granted as an apanage on terms which precluded claims by women, either 
as heiresses or dowagers. Moreover the fourth earl’s son had never done homage for the lands 
and his male line was now extinct, justifying Charles’s resumption of possession.103  
The French king also replied to another approach by Earl William. ‘Concerning the 
service which my lord of Douglas offered to do for the king, the king thanks him and if it 
happens that he has need to seek the said lord of Douglas for people or other things, he would 
always follow the terms of the alliances between him and the king of Scots, his brother and 
ally’.104 This suggests that Earl William had followed the fourth earl in making a direct offer 
of military service to Charles VII as a means of securing his predecessor’s French lands. 
Charles, whose situation had changed greatly since 1424, had no interest in this offer but 
Douglas may have made a parallel approach to Philip of Burgundy. Though there is no 
evidence of an agreement between the duke and the earl, in autumn 1450 Douglas travelled to 
the Netherlands. On 12 October at Lille ‘the earl of Douglas and many knights and squires of 
the kingdom of Scotland’ dined with Philip duke of Burgundy and ‘many other great lords of 
the household of my lord’.105 This gathering was part of the earl’s pilgrimage to Rome to 
mark the Papal jubilee. The meeting at Lille also represented another retracing of the fourth 
earl of Douglas’s steps, perhaps in hopes of a similar contract with the duke of Burgundy. His 
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predecessor had sought to create a career on the continent prior to James I’s return to 
Scotland in 1424. In his offer to Charles VII and meeting with Duke Philip, Earl William may 
have been seeking the same. 
If so, Douglas’s efforts misfired. Charles VII, who had long experience of 
independent vassals, made clear that he would only deal with Scotland via her king rather 
than individual lords however powerful. The prospect of Douglas in Burgundian service or 
nurturing claims on Touraine would have been unwelcome to Charles. There is an intriguing 
letter to the French king from William Turnbull the new bishop of Glasgow and close 
councillor of James II in July 1450. Turnbull reported that Charles had asked the bishop to 
assist James with regard to the matters which he has sent to Scotland.106 While this is 
obviously vague, the early sixteenth-century Scottish chronicle composed by John Law 
named Turnbull and Crichton as the councillors who would persuade James to harry 
Douglas’s lands whilst the earl was on pilgrimage in late 1450.107 Both bishop and chancellor 
had their own reasons for hostility to the earl, but there is the possibility that Charles VII, to 
whom James II would remain closely attached, provided a means of pushing the Scottish king 
to violence against the pilgrim earl by revealing Douglas’s search for continental service.108 
James II’s attack on the lands of the Douglases altered everything. It proved to be the 
first of three conflicts between the king and the magnate family which would see James kill 
Earl William in 1452 and, in 1455, finally bring about the downfall of the dynasty. During 
these clashes James would keep Charles VII informed of his actions, perhaps recognising the 
French king’s direct interest in events.109 King James’s initial attack on the earl in late 1450 
probably put paid to any co-operation between Douglas and Burgundy. On his side, Duke 
Philip would hardly have wished to antagonise his recent ally and his great-niece’s husband. 
As with Charles VII, Burgundy put his faith in the Scottish king over his greatest subject.  
The events of 1448 to 1450 marked the end of the continental ambitions of the 
Douglases. The evidence suggests that the family used its influence with the royal 
government to push its own agenda during these years.110 However, these goals were only 
part of a web of individual and collective interests behind Scottish military and political 
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activities in these years. These illustrate that, as Lazzarini observes, there was no easy gap 
between ‘diplomacy’ and ‘‘internal’ politics’.111 The marriages of the king and his sisters 
with their consequences for the future of the realm and the royal dynasty, as well as the 
connections they formed with continental princes, were one obvious example of this. The 
possibility, as stated in the treaty of 1448, of Duke Francis of Brittany ascending to the 
Scottish throne provides one, unfulfilled consequence of such connections. The French 
alliance with its established importance for Scotland’s security and status represented a 
second deep bond between Scotland and the wider world. It allowed Scots like Nicholas 
Chalmers and William Monypenny to make careers at the French royal court and, in turn, use 
their positions to support the continuance of this bond.  
Though apparently removed from the centre of war and politics in the late 1440s and 
early 1450s, not necessarily a bad thing if Scotland’s position is compared with that of 
Brittany, the kingdom was in no sense remote from events in northern France. Scottish 
politics, like those of Burgundy, Brittany, France and England, cannot be understood in terms 
of a distinct, insulated bloc. The multiple goals of the envoys sent from Scotland in 1448, the 
complicated link between warfare in the Anglo-Scottish borders and the tensions on the 
frontiers of Normandy, and the shifting relations between the rulers of England, France and 
Burgundy were the shape of things to come. From 1450 onwards, Scotland’s kings and their 
councillors found themselves part of an increasingly interconnected world which extended 
from the Mediterranean to Scandinavia and in which old certainties of friendship and enmity 
could not be relied upon. Internal conflicts could not be contained but became ongoing 
factors in relations between realms. James II’s conflict with the Douglases, whose origins 
were not unconnected with external relationships, would leave the exiled earl of Douglas as a 
valuable asset for the English in their dealings with Scotland. The parallel flight of Henry VI, 
his queen and his heir into Scotland would make Scotland a focus of international diplomacy 
in 1461-3. For the Scots the years after 1450 would prove a period of greater opportunity and 
risk. With hindsight, the activities of the Scottish king, his council, envoys and servants, in 
1448 and 1449 in shaping Scotland’s external links and contacts may be regarded as the start 
of this new era. 
                                                 
111 I. Lazzarini, Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350-1520 (Oxford, 
2015), 13 
